Seventy years ago, Aldous Huxley published his famous novel Brave New World, which remains widely admired for its technological prescience. It depicts a future in which biotechnology has led to a society without suffering but also without purpose, where social order is maintained by cloning and eugenics, and everyone is kept happy by safe and effective psychotropic drugs.
Since then, predictions of technological doom have become commonplace, but a new book, Our Posthuman Future by Francis Fukuyama, has more credibility than most examples of the genre. Fukuyama, a political philosopher at Johns Hopkins University, has recently been appointed to the President's Council on Bioethics. He is well known in the US as a 'big thinker' , mainly for his argument that the worldwide triumph of liberal democracy represents in some sense 'the end of history' . In Our Posthuman Future, he argues that the ability to alter human nature through biotechnology represents a new turning point for our species.
Fukuyama believes that neuroscience in particular presents several imminent challenges to our traditional conception of what it means to be human. The first, clearly foreseen by Huxley, is the increasing use of mind-altering chemicals. Drugs such as Prozac and Ritalin have generated much public debate, mainly because they are widely used to treat conditions whose diagnostic boundaries are not well defined. Ritalin, for instance, is often prescribed for children-mainly boys-who meet the diagnostic criteria for attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder. But evolution did not design boys to sit still in class, and while some may be too restless for their own good, the recognition of ADHD as a medical condition can also be regarded as social engineering-a response to the demands of busy parents and overworked teachers. Fukuyama does not dispute that psychiatric drugs can bring great benefits, but he is concerned over the increasing 'medicalization' of human personality. He also notes that the pharmaceutical industry has a strong vested interest in promoting this view; Novartis, for instance, is said to have made undisclosed donations of almost $900,000 to one leading ADHD advocacy group.
Another challenge is the prolongation of life. Whether or not new technologies such as stem cells further increase lifespan, the populations of many industrialized countries are aging dramatically. The economic dangers are widely acknowledged, and everyone agrees that treatments to preserve mental powers in old age are urgently needed. However, such treatments may lead to other problems that are less widely discussed. For example, if the elderly remain active, they will be reluctant to concede power to younger people, who will increasingly see their ambitions being thwarted by the generations preceding them.
The third and perhaps most threatening challenge is eugenics. Its current low reputation rests on two criticisms: that it is scientifically unfounded, and that it is associated with a history of governmental coercion. In Fukuyama's view, however, both arguments are collapsing. Many human attributes, including cognitive abilities, clearly have a hereditary component, and identification of the genes responsible will raise the possibility of effective intervention. Although germ-line modification does not seem imminent and may never be widespread, pre-implantation screening is already happening. It will spread, not through government policy but through the choices of individual parents, likely accelerating as the technology becomes cheaper and more efficient. (Anyone who finds this scenario implausible should look to Korea and China, where the traditional preference for male children, combined with easy access to sonograms and abortions, has recently led to a dramatic shift in the birth ratio of the sexes.)
One does not have to be a Luddite to agree that these are serious concerns. Indeed, Fukuyama argues that our entire system of morality rests on conceptions of human equality and dignity that are now under threat from our emerging ability to manipulate our own natures. Science alone cannot resolve these questions any more than religion can; neither perspective will be sufficient to build political consensus in a pluralistic society.
The usual response to such concerns is to call for more discussion, but advisory panels and discussion groups generally cannot enforce their recommendations. Fukuyama believes that new regulatory authorities are essential if technology is to be controlled. Self-policing by the biomedical community will not work, given the large financial interests involved. Existing regulatory bodies such as the US Food and Drug Administration are not well suited to make nuanced ethical judgments outside their traditional areas of safety and efficacy. Instead, he argues, we need new legislation and new agencies to implement it, perhaps along the lines of Britain's Fertilization and Embryology Authority.
The inadequacy of the current system is illustrated by the worldwide debate over human cloning. Opinions are highly polarized, and different countries have adopted a bewildering range of regulations, many of which appear to be shallow political compromises rather than reflecting deep social consensuswitness for example the discrepancy in the US between the stringent regulation of government-funded research on human cloning and the near-absence of regulation in the private sector. But out of the cacophony, a consensus is emerging on at least one point, namely that human reproductive (as opposed to therapeutic) cloning should be illegal. Fukuyama sees this consensus as an opportunity; if most countries can agree on such a ban, there is a much better chance of establishing a credible international regulatory framework for human biotechnology in general. Such a framework seems urgently needed; as Our Posthuman Future emphasizes, the current cloning debate is merely the tip of a large and rapidly emerging iceberg.
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